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The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, abbreviated to Quad, comprises Australia, the United 
States, Japan, and India. Although many think tanks and media outlets have written 
about recommendations to further this initiative, this essay believes the Quad is only 
evidence of a rising patchwork of small strategical dialogues within the Indo-Pacific region. 
The aims here are twofold: (a) to demonstrate the definitions and relevance of the Quad 
amid the soaring rivalry in the Indo-Pacific; and (b) to grasp this initiative as a “minilateral” 
grouping, which is settled in a more informal structure than multilateral institutions. In 
assessing these hypotheses, this research employs a qualitative content analysis of official 
statements and documents about the Quad meeting and national policies toward the 
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Indo-Pacific. A systematic bibliographical review was applied to refine theoretical frameworks 
and to triangulate sources. In conclusion, this paper infers the Quad is not as ambitious and 
strong as previous literature claimed. These four members developed divergent interests in 
the Indo-Pacific; thereby, an alliance against China seems unlikely.
Keywords: Quadrilateral Security Dialogue; Minilateralism; Indo-Pacific.
Resumo
O Diálogo Quadrilateral de Segurança, abreviado para Quad, é composto pela Austrália, 
Estados Unidos, Japão e Índia. Embora muitos think tanks e meios de comunicação tenham 
promovido recomendações para essa iniciativa, este artigo acredita que o Quad é apenas 
uma evidência de uma crescente rede de pequenos diálogos estratégicos na região Indo-
Pacífico. Os objetivos aqui são duplos: (a) demonstrar as definições e a relevância do Quad 
em meio à crescente rivalidade no Indo-Pacífico; e (b) compreender essa iniciativa como um 
agrupamento “minilateral”, estabelecido em uma estrutura mais informal que propriamente 
instituições multilaterais. Ao avaliar essas hipóteses, esta pesquisa emprega uma análise 
qualitativa de conteúdo de declarações e documentos oficiais sobre a reunião da Quad e 
políticas nacionais para o Indo-Pacífico. Uma revisão bibliográfica sistemática foi aplicada 
para refinar referenciais teóricos e para triangular fontes. Em conclusão, este artigo infere 
que o Quad não é tão ambicioso e forte quanto a literatura anterior alegou. Esses quatro 
membros desenvolveram interesses divergentes no Indo-Pacífico; assim, uma aliança contra 
a China parece improvável.
Palavras-chave: Diálogo Quadrilateral de Segurança; Minilateralismo; Indo-Pacífico.
Introduction
This essay aims to understand the relevance of the Quadrilateral Security 
Dialogue, abbreviated to Quad, to the current power shifts in the Indo-Pacific 
region. The Quad is an initiative comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the 
United States. It was revived in November 2017 when officials of these four 
countries met on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Manila (Miller 2018). Its 
first configuration occurred in 2007 and lasted until 2008. Many pundits, think 
tanks, and journalists referred to this initiative as a historical movement towards 
an embryonic democratic alliance to challenge China’s growing regional influence. 
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Such a hypothesis for this scenario is based upon two explaining variables: 
(1) the soaring rivalry between China and the United States within the Indo-Pacific 
region, and (2) the improvement of diplomatic ties among these four democracies. 
The quad hence would be an initiative aimed at the coordination of policies in 
the Indo-Pacific region, which is becoming the world’s economic and strategic 
center of gravity (Cha 2014; Jaishankar 2017).
This paper aims to demonstrate a different hypothesis to assess the relevance of 
the Quad within the Indo-Pacific region disputes. The main topics to be addressed 
during this essay are: (a) to show that Quad is not a ‘military alliance’ and its 
real configurations are less impressive than what some experts and media outlets 
propose; (b) to describe the convergences and divergences of the four members 
of Quad in their conceptions of Indo-Pacific region and in their policies to deal 
with Beijing; finally, (c) to analyze Quad as part of this ‘minilateralist’ network 
of groupings and initiatives that historically exists as a diplomatic interaction 
within this context; in other words, mechanisms established by small groups of 
countries which converge in certain issues and are usually settled in more informal 
structures than multilateral institutions (Jaishankar 2018; Wuthnow 2019).
In assessing these hypotheses, this research employs qualitative methods 
to collect evidence. Two instruments are applied: (a) a content analysis to find 
observable implication inside primary sources; and a (b) systematic literature 
review to refine our theoretical framework and hypotheses. Such descriptive 
inferences serve to demonstrate how this work fills a gap in the literature.
This action depicted the geopolitical context to be tackled throughout the 
paper. Inferences produced by content analysis were triangulated to secondary 
sources. The theoretical framework was developed during the systematic review 
of literature about the geopolitical disputes within the Indo-Pacific. On Chinese 
influence in the Indo-Pacific, secondary sources were used to complement the lack 
of a considerable amount of Chinese governmental sources translated to English. 
Research papers published in leading peer-reviewed journals were selected to 
enhance the confidence in our findings. Likewise, articles from Chinese official-
leaning editorial newspapers were used as proxy evidence. 
Documents analyzed referred to the national perspective on the Quad. Two 
sorts of documents were evaluated: official statements on Indo-Pacific national 
strategies and reports about Quad meetings. The former provides some observable 
implications to investigate the latter. How a country engages in the Quad is related 
to its national policy towards the Indo-Pacific. 
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The four members issue self-reported documents after the meetings, instead 
of doing it together. Therefore, official statements about Quad meetings were 
evaluated as primary sources. The idea was identifying how each country: 
(a) defines this mechanism; (b) ultimate aims; (c) perspectives about furthering 
the ongoing agenda; and (e) any mention about China to check whether Beijing 
is considered a rival that sparked the creation of Quad. The period analyzed starts 
from its revival in 2017. 
The motivations that sparked this investigation of the Quad was the observation 
that this dialogue has a more vivid life inside the media or think tanks summits 
than the actual achievements of governments. Three groups are considered 
responsible for this scenario: (a) the alarmist Chinese media led by the Global 
Times, a newspaper with a pro-government editorial stance; (b) the ‘hawkish’ 
scholars and media outlets which depict the Quad as an embryonic ‘Asian NATO’ 
seeking to set a comprehensive agenda against growing leverage of Beijing in the 
Indo-Pacific under the rule of Xi Jinping; and (c) think tanks releasing reports or 
organizing summits envisaging possibilities to the Quad instead of describing its 
actual configurations. 
Among these groups, the Chinese media outlets are the wariest. The idea of 
the rise of an alliance against Beijing gained momentum with the Quad; thereby, 
this initiative is overrated when embedded in a dispute between the United States 
and China. One can read in these newspapers the Quad described as: an initiative 
‘doomed to fail’ or ‘aimed to target China,’ ‘a cornerstone of Washington’s Asia 
strategy to counterbalance China,’ ‘united front to contain China’ and ‘a threat to 
ASEAN unity because it could undermine the roles of this organization in regional 
cooperation’ (Godement 2018; Liu 2018; Long 2018; Zhao 2019). Likewise, the 
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi demonstrated irritation with the Quad calling 
it “an idea that would dissipate like the seafoam” (Rai 2017).
There are also the ‘hawkish’ scholars, such as Chellaney (2017), who 
endorses the settlement of a strategic constellation of democracies to contain the 
challenges that threaten to disrupt stability and impede economic growth in the 
Indo-Pacific. Such analysts believe that the Quad is a relevant mechanism in a 
supposedly future dispute between the U.S.-led liberal international order against 
the authoritarian alternative delivered by China. Unjhawala (2018) wrote that the 
initiative could make great headway toward containing Beijing’s international 
projects. These interpretations conclude that geopolitical and security factors 
or even converging political regimes can lure these four countries into the idea 
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of grouping against China regardless of the explanatory variable of divergences 
among national interests and capabilities (Ayres 2019; Rai 2017). Furthermore, 
during both the 2018 Halifax International Security Forum and the 2019 Raisina 
Dialogue, panels gathered army officials due to think tanks invitations. Strategic 
pundits and media outlets reported them as governmental initiatives towards the 
formalization of a grouping to contain Beijing, although those events were not 
official initiatives.
These definitions of the Quad need to be confronted due to an ongoing 
overstretching of this concept. The Quad as a dialogue began to be grasped as 
the whole network of bilateral and trilateral initiatives involving India, Japan, the 
United States, and Australia (Jaishankar 2018). Without a clear agenda about its 
purposes, many aspects were entitled as part of the aims of the Quad. This essay 
advocates that journalists or pundits who endorsed this common perspective about 
this subject incur in the imprecision of their research design due to an omitted 
variable problem. The quad is only another part of the security architecture of 
the Indo-Pacific, which historically comprises many “minilateral” initiatives 
and where multilateral institutions are deficient in solving regional problems 
(Green 2014; Wuthnow 2019). In other words, these interpretations are biased 
to overestimate the Quad and make invalid inferences because (a) this initiative 
would be considered a unique security-minded dialogue aimed to hedge against 
Chinese global activities; (b) likewise, the concept of Indo-Pacific would be based 
on a singular strategic meaning (Chacko and Panda 2019; Mishra 2019; Wroe and 
Needham 2018; Wuthnow 2019); and (c) this perception also sees this grouping 
strongly linked to United States’ ambitions and meaning of the Indo-Pacific region 
since Washington’s idea of a growing competition against China could be replicated 
in other members (Curran 2018). 
The question hence is how much formalized a dialogue could be if it 
were assumed that each state holds its own national strategy on international 
engagement. This paper refers to “formalized” as the capacity of an organization 
to set an agenda, to craft an official charter and bureaucracy, and to be considered 
a relevant aspect to its members’ foreign policy. Domestic politics debates on 
foreign policy and divergent perspectives are explanatory variables that could not 
be dismissed in order to avoid measurement errors when attempting to understand 
the Quad, once this initiative has never gone further than an informal dialogue 
without an official agenda (Gyngell 2018; Madan 2017).
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The paper is divided as follows: (1) this introduction; (2) analysis on 
the expansion of the Chinese sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific since the 
ascension of Xi Jinping to power; (3) description of the real configurations of the 
Quad to characterize this grouping as part of a tangle of strategies and initiatives 
proposed by these four countries in the Indo-Pacific region; (4) a study stretching 
the meaning of the term Indo-Pacific once this concept is crucial to observe 
convergences and divergences inside the Quad in order to analyze each state’s 
ambitions and perceptions of the geopolitics of this region; and (5) a section with 
final considerations.
The Enlargement of the Chinese Sphere of Influence:  
An Assertive Beijing
The rise of China’s material capability is impressive. Starting at the country’s 
reform and opening policy, under Deng Xiaoping, between 1978 and 2010, the 
Chinese economy grew at an average rate of 10 percent per year, when it slipped 
to the current 6 to 7 percent annually (Naughton 2020). The country reached the 
position of the world’s second-largest economy in 2010 when its gross domestic 
product (GDP/PPP) surpassed Japan’s and today’s figures at $25.1 trillion 
(Allison 2017; International Monetary Fund 2018).
Since the rise of Xi Jinping to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in 2012, the country has exhibited increased confidence and proactiveness 
on the world stage. The president has abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s prescription 
for passive diplomacy (“bide time, hide brightness do not take the lead”) with his 
more activist dictum “striving for achievement”. Xi has also emphasized “China 
Dream”, China’s “great rejuvenation”, and a “community of a shared future for 
mankind” (Wang 2019; Shambaugh 2020).
Xi has also launched the concept of “major-country diplomacy”, which means 
to transform the mission of China’s diplomacy from seeking a peaceful environment 
conducive to domestic development to one that puts expanding China’s global 
reach as a linchpin to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation 
(Hu 2019; Zhao 2020). In June 2018, Xi underscored these goals during the Central 
Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, when he urged the foreign policy 
cadres to pursue “the efforts to firmly safeguard China’s sovereignty, security 
and development interests, take an active part in leading the reform of the global 
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 15, n. 2, 2020, p. 52-82
58 The Quad: One More ‘Minilateral’ Initiative, not an Embryonic Military Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Region
governance system, and build a more complete network of global partnerships” 
(Xinhua 2018).
To advance major-country diplomacy, Beijing has searched for a security 
strategy that aims to project influence over the Indo-Pacific region through the 
employment of its recently acquired economic, political, and military capabilities. 
In 2013, Beijing launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to link 
China to Europe through Central Asia and Russia; to the Middle East through 
Central Asia; and to Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. Whereas, 
the “road” aims to connect China with Europe through the South China Sea and the 
Indian Ocean; and with the South Pacific through the South China Sea. It is also a 
massive project involving the funding and construction of an infrastructure system 
of roads, railways, oil and natural gas pipelines, fiber-optic and communication 
systems, ports, and airports. BRI encompasses 65 countries and reaches more than 
60% of the global population. Estimations indicate that the project will cost more 
than $1 trillion to China and, in the last five years, Beijing has already invested 
more than $210 billion in it (Hendler 2019; Kuo and Kommenda 2018; Pautasso, 
Leite and Doria 2017; Zhang, Alon and Latteman 2018).
However, some analysts state that this initiative could trigger undesirable 
outcomes in vulnerable countries, fostering corruption, and autocratic behavior 
in these fragile democracies. The debt trap, occurs when the states are not able 
to pay the loans conceded by the Chinese government to arguably consolidate the 
ambitious infrastructural projects, would drive them to a dependence on China. 
Beijing already holds most of the debt of many nations along the BRI, such as 
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kenya, 
and Djibouti (Berlie 2020; Fernholz 2018; Mayer 2018).
China has also been steadily increasing its annual defense spending since 2007, 
reaching $170.4 billion in 2018, the equivalent of 1.3 percent of its GDP. The Chinese 
government has been focused on the modernization of the 2 million personnel-
strong PLA as a warfighting instrument through the improvement of military 
professionalism. Furthermore, China has also been developing new capabilities 
that will enhance Beijing’s ability to project power and to deny foreign regional 
intervention, namely, unmanned aircraft vehicles, stealth fighter jets, aircraft carriers, 
and anti-ship ballistic missiles (Defense Intelligence Agency 2019; Economy 2018).
At the same time, China has sought to assert its presence more forcefully in 
its neighborhood, especially the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Beijing 
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claims sovereignty over most of the area of the South China Sea through its nine-
dash line, which encompasses the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, and the 
Scarborough Shoal. It is a major transport hub through which the goods to and 
from Northeast Asia are shipped, and the area contains reserves of crude oil and 
gas. The zone is disputed by Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, 
and Taiwan. Since 2014, Beijing has been engaged in massive reclamation projects 
and the construction of artificial islands in at least seven locations in the Spratly 
Islands and at least three locations in the Paracel Islands (Hendler 2019; Pautasso, 
Leite and Doria 2017; Turcsányi 2018).
In the document China’s National Defense in the New Era (The State Council 
Information Office of The People’s Republic of China 2019), the Chinese government 
stresses that “the South China Sea islands (…) are inalienable parts of the Chinese 
territory” (p. 7). It also remembers that “China exercises its national sovereignty to 
build infrastructure and deploy necessary defensive capabilities on the islands and 
reefs in the South China Sea” (p. 7). The Chinese stance is due to the increasing 
pressure exerted by the foreign military presence in the region, such as the Quad 
members, the United Kingdom, and France. Zhang (2019) observes that when it 
comes to resolving territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Beijing has cautiously 
approached the use of coercion in the region. The author notes that China relies 
on military coercion less often the stronger it becomes, preferring to employ 
unconventional tools such as coercive threats and “gray-zone coercion”. Gray-zone 
coercion involves physical violence; however, it uses much smaller capabilities 
than the military coercion. A recent example happened in 2014 when Beijing 
used maritime law enforcement vessels to ram Vietnamese vessels in response 
to Vietnam’s opposition to Chinese oil rigs operating in the Paracel Islands. Both 
countries claim sovereignty over the Paracels. Nevertheless, China has occupied 
the islands since 1974, where it has built military garrisons (housing 1,400 PLA 
officials), an airfield, and an artificial harbor (Lendon 2019; Zhang 2019).
At the same time, the expansion of the Chinese economic and military clout 
in the Indo-Pacific creates a deep connection in the security arena between East 
and South Asia. It also has the goal to secure Chinese sea lines of communication 
(SLOCs) and displace the US Navy as the predominant navy in the Indian Ocean 
(Brewster 2019).
The United States is seeking a way to counteract the Chinese assertiveness 
since the Barack Obama administration (2009-2017). In November 2011, Obama 
promised to increase U.S. American diplomatic, economic and military presence 
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in the Asia-Pacific and signaled the U.S. determination to counter the impact of 
China’s rise in the region (Allison 2017). The United States declared that it was not 
directed to any one country (“China”) and identified the five broad and interrelated 
components of the rebalance: 1) Strengthening and modernizing security alliances; 
2) Forging deeper relationships with emerging powers; 3) Engaging more deeply 
in regional and global institutions to advance regional cooperation, peaceful 
resolution of disputes, and adherence to human rights and international law; 
4) Pursuing a stable and constructive relationship with China; and 5) Advancing 
the region’s economic architecture, such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (Mccormick 2016).
After his inauguration in 2017, President Donald Trump officially terminated 
the engagement policy toward China and opted for competitive policies. The 
2018 National Defense Strategy indicated that China would “continue to pursue a 
military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the 
near term and displacement of the United States to achieve global pre-eminence 
in the future” (Department Of Defense 2018, 2). Therefore, the United States 
has sought to increase its military presence in Asia. Between 2017 and 2019, 
Washington carried out “freedom of navigation operations” (FONOPS) 15 times 
in the South China Sea (Wu 2019).
On its turn, India fears encroachment on its zone of strategic interest as well as 
encirclement from Chinese projects in Pakistan. Japan is wary of China’s ability to 
influence the energy supply chains on which East Asia depends and the possibility 
of the country to use BRI to further push its People’s Liberation Army into the 
Indian and Pacific Ocean regions, a move that could destabilize regional security. 
Australia is concerned that China’s project aid could render fragile states more 
vulnerable to coercion. These shared concerns on the expansion of the Chinese 
political and military clout were fundamental to the revival of the Quad by the 
four countries (Gale and Shearer 2018; Herskovitz 2019; Medcalf 2018; Pautasso, 
Leite and Doria 2017).
Since the rise of Xi Jinping to power, the authorities have systematically 
silenced human rights lawyers and all manner of peaceful criticism of the 
government. Many have been forcibly disappeared or arbitrarily detained. Beyond 
that, the state-controlled media have steadily discredited their work, trying to 
deter future generations of whistle-blowers and others who seek to challenge 
state authorities (Roth 2020).
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There is a growing concern about what China’s domestic crackdown means 
for international security and the U.S.-led liberal international order. One of the 
main analysts of China’s rise, Yan Xuetong (2019), says that the Chinese leadership 
should recover the thought of philosophers from China’s pre-Qin era (prior to 221 
B.C.) who argued that a country should be loved rather than to be feared by other 
states. The author advocates that China should seek respect from its international 
counterparts through “humane authority”, a crucial component of global power, 
along with economic and military strength. For Yan (2019), “humane authority 
requires consistency between a leading state’s domestic ideology and the political 
values it pursues abroad” (p. 53). Thus, the author contends that the international 
community is put off by China’s domestic rule and its assertive foreign policy, 
which significantly damages its legitimacy abroad and capacity to lead. Yan warns 
that Chinese officials should abandon their repressive practices at home if they 
want to “lead by example” in the international arena (Nyrén 2019; Yan 2019).
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the Indo-Pacific regional 
architecture of security dialogues
First and foremost, it is essential to usher to what this initiative is not. 
In 2017, the Quad returned as a topic inside official circles. At the same time, 
‘Indo-Pacific’ also became a recurring strategic terminology amid the soaring 
geopolitical tensions and concerns about China’s actions along the Indo-Pacific 
(Choong 2019; Madan 2017). This scenario reinvigorated the argument that Quad 
is an initiative with an offensive agenda towards Beijing, and its activities would 
be related to the military potential of these four states to demonstrate interests 
in regional maritime security issues (Ayres 2019; Grossman 2018). However, the 
Quad is still not a formal military alliance or even an emulation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) due to the five following aspects: 
(a) It is a group without a legally binding treaty; therefore, members are not 
officially committed to the principle of mutual defense (Kuo 2018). (b) The Quad 
does not have an official schedule or a formal agenda (Madan 2017). (c) The 
meetings are not even formalized at a ministerial level (Tweed, Koutsoukis and 
Scott 2018). (d) The name Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is not institutionalized. 
Leaders and bureaucracies from the four countries do not refer to this initiative in 
a singular fashion. For example, the last National Security Strategy of the United 
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 15, n. 2, 2020, p. 52-82
62 The Quad: One More ‘Minilateral’ Initiative, not an Embryonic Military Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Region
States of America demonstrates the existence of a ‘quadrilateral cooperation’ 
(White House 2017). Furthermore, Australian and Indian governmental authorities 
refused to use ‘quadrilateral security dialogue’ to officially name this diplomatic 
mechanism (Ministry of External Affairs 2019b; Parliament of Australia 2007). 
Actually, the name Quadrilateral Security Dialogue was coined and widespread 
by scholars and journalists who envisaged the allocation of India to the already 
existing Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) between Australia, Japan, and the 
United States (Lu 2018; Sharma 2010). (e) Likewise, references to this grouping 
are more often found in academic journals and newspapers rather than in official 
documents (Curran 2018).
In reference to the last topic, comparing the four statements about those 
diplomatic meetings is an excellent exercise to notice divergences among these 
countries (Panda 2018). India, which some scholars and media outlets consider the 
weakest link of the Quad, prefers a milder reference to the need to ensure respect 
towards international law than its partners. In the last three statements, New Delhi 
advocated for an inclusive Indo-Pacific (Panda 2018; Ministry of External Affairs 
2018a; 2018b; 2019a). On the other hand, Indian statements have similarities with 
other countries in terms of concerns with terrorism and the necessity to increase 
regional connectivity based on transparency and territorial integrity (Ministry 
Of External Affairs 2018b). The United States, Australia, and Japan have already 
emphasized democratic values as a pillar of this initiative (Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 2018b; Department of State 2017a; 2018b; Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2017a; 2018b).
The word ‘quadrilateral’ appeared only in Canberra’s and Washington’s 
statements — an aspect that demonstrates a sort of blockage to classify this 
dialogue, such as a group initiative (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
2017; Department of State 2017a; Panda 2018). The initial ‘Quad’ was only used 
in a document from Washington (Department of State 2019). The United States 
and Australia were also the only countries to recognize the discussion of political 
issues involving the Maldives and Sri Lanka — India, notoriously considered as 
the highest interesting part, averted mentioning it to avoid challenging Beijing (De 
Silva 2019; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2018b; Department of State 
2018e; Malik 2018; Ministry of External Affairs 2018b). Furthermore, in 2019, all 
the statements depicted the ASEAN-led mechanisms as initiatives to be supported 
to reaffirm the intention to preserve the peace and freedom within the Indo-Pacific 
region (Department of State 2019; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2019; 
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Ministry of External Affairs 2019a; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018a). Canberra 
and Washington also reported their support to The Pacific Islands Forum and the 
Indian Ocean Rim Association in a moment that Beijing attempts to increase its 
influence through the Pacific — a region with many states that still recognize 
Taiwan diplomatically.
Likewise, it is worth mentioning that the Quad is a grouping comprising: a 
superpower (the United States), a rising power (India), a traditional middle-power 
(Australia), and a military-constrained economic leading-power (Japan). Therefore, 
regarding the Quad, an instrument to Washington is an equivocated perspective 
because, despite being the most powerful country in the group, it is not possible to 
affirm that they agree on controversial topics such as dealing with Chinese growing 
regional leverage or regional interests (Ayres 2019; Rai 2017). Inserting Quad into 
disputes between Washington and Beijing is not only a misinterpretation of Indian, 
Japanese and Australian perspectives over the issues, but it also overestimates the 
current capabilities of this initiative by setting an agenda that the officials have 
not done yet (Curran 2018; Madan 2017; Mishra 2019).
Those misconceptions about the Quad buried the first attempts to formalize 
this grouping from 2007 to 2008 (Madan 2017). Beginning as an initiative called 
Tsunami Core Group, it aimed temporarily to coordinate operations of humanitarian 
relief for vulnerable people and villages affected by the tsunami that occurred in 
2004. Many observers believed the maintenance of this arrangement would mean 
a concert of democracies to balance against China (Jaishankar 2018; Madan 2017; 
Medcalf 2008; Rai 2017). This vision was considered too provocative by leaders 
and diplomats, mainly from Australia and India. Beijing was promptly assured that 
they were not establishing a security alliance after Chinese officials demonstrated 
concerns over the endorsement by the Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe and 
the then-U.S. vice president Richard B. Cheney to the solidification of this dialogue 
and on the fact that, in 2007, these four countries joined the naval drills called 
Malabar exercises that Washington and New Delhi organize annually (Madan 
2017; Medcalf 2008; Pattanaik 2016; Rudd 2019). Likewise, this situation hampered 
the formation of domestic political consensus about the Quad so that Yasuo 
Fukuda, Shinzo Abe’s successor after his resignation in 2007, and Kevin Rudd, 
who assumed in 2007 the role of the prime minister of Australia, did not show 
the same enthusiasm for this mechanism (Rai 2017; Rudd 2019; Wuthnow 2019).
Once overlapped those issues, it is important to demonstrate what Quad 
really is. The best description of the Quad is an association of Australia, India, 
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Japan, and the United States aimed to facilitate their conversation and diplomatic 
cooperation. (Ayres 2019; Madan 2017). According to the United States Department 
of the State (Department of State, 2017a), these four partners gather together 
because they are “committed to deepen cooperation, which rests on a foundation 
of shared democratic values and principles, and to continue discussions to further 
strengthen the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region”. However, countries 
develop different interests and approaches to the Quad once this initiative does 
not define clear guidelines; hence these four partners only underscore, in each 
statement, aspects of their interests following foreign policy strategies (Hardy 
2019; Panda 2018).
As a matter of fact, this diplomatic arrangement has never gone further than a 
“less-than-alliance formation” in which these four countries cautiously watch the 
rise of China’s international political and economic clout and to the consequent 
redefinition in the global balance of power. However, they were not able to set a 
unique and sophisticated agenda towards the Indo-Pacific region in this initiative 
due to constraints imposed by domestic politics issues (Ayres 2019; Jaishankar 
2017; O’Neil and West 2019). Furthermore, military meetings among members 
of the Quad happened only within think tanks summits — official quadrilateral 
dialogues related to diplomatic instances. Therefore, “suggest that the Quad is an 
alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, or a mechanism aimed at containing 
China, or to conflate it with understandings of the Indo-Pacific construct assigns 
far too much strategic gravitas to the grouping at this stage” (Byrne 2019, 18).
A goal achieved by this initiative is demonstrating to Beijing that these four 
states are able to group up in small forums to discuss geopolitical issues (Curran 
2018). The Quad is not as relevant as some media outlets proposed as an institution. 
Still, it is a good example to observe the maintenance of “minilateralism” as a 
way of strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, the best way to 
grasp its real significance is to examine the Quad as part of a matrix of initiatives 
comprising these four countries (Jaishankar 2018). Although this mechanism does 
not have an official agenda, its members have developed trilateral and bilateral 
strategic dialogues aimed to improve their ties in many instances, such as military 
cooperation, infrastructure projects, and intelligence-sharing (Wuthnow 2019).
Descriptive analyses confirm the historical existence of “minilateralism” in Asia 
and Oceania once Washington has preferred to engage with its regional partners 
through a “hub-and-spoke” system since the Cold War (Cha 2014; Hemmer and 
Katzenstein 2002; Wuthnow 2019). It is not the case here to explore the reasons 
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for this evidence. Still, it is an important implication to view the Quad as part 
of this framework of small initiatives serving strategic ends usually do not move 
forward in terms of formalization (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002).
For example, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), established 
in 1954 and formally disbanded in 1977, was the eastern initiative endorsed by 
the United States that advanced the most in terms of formalization since it was 
headquartered in Bangkok and hosted military exercises. However, it had very 
few formal functions, and the official charter did not prescribe sophisticated 
mechanisms of mutual protection or the constitution of a common military force 
(Department of State 2017b). This aspect provides a relevant systematic feature 
of historical Washington’s preference to coordinate its policy towards the Indo-
Pacific through a bilateral or trilateral mechanism, rather than a multilateral 
institution, and the continuous idea about establishing a NATO-style organization 
in Asia and Oceania (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002; Cha 2014). It is important 
to underscore that among the reasons that dismantled those organizations was 
the fact that some states disagreed with the United States’ actions in Vietnam 
and Cambodia. Domestic politics strategies and perceptions played a crucial role 
in the development of the SEATO (Department of State, 2017b).
The consolidation of this entangled framework of small-scale activities within 
the Indo-Pacific region is not only sparked by the United States’ efforts, but also 
China and other countries have developed instruments according to their individual 
need to carve out new diplomatic and security ties without spending excessive capital 
and time to structure a multilateral organization (Medcalf 2015; Wuthnow 2019). 
Thus, over the past 20 years, it is possible to infer that “minilateralism” was 
consolidated as a diplomatic trend within this context once it facilitates dialogues 
among selected partners. Even so, this aspect does not necessarily incentive the 
institutionalization of these small forums, preventing countries from setting legally 
binding activities upon all partners, an instance that could constrain their own 
strategies (Wuthnow 2019).
Australia, India, Japan, and the United States join different “minilateral” 
forums that can compete against Beijing in specific issues. This paper underscores 
a bunch of initiatives into this context. However, bearing in mind that national 
programs are working concomitantly in the same areas such as the South Asia 
Regional Infrastructure Connectivity initiative (SARIC) in Australia, the Expanded 
Partnership for Quality Infrastructure in Japan or the Asia Reassurance Initiative 
Act in the United States (Choong 2019). The aim here is to prioritize instruments 
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comprising more than one member of the Quad and only these four states, 
although they also group with other regional countries such as the United States-
Japan–South Korea Trilateral Ministerial Meeting or the Indonesia-Australia-India 
Senior Officials’ Strategic Dialogue (Wuthnow 2019). Moreover, these mechanisms 
present different degrees of consolidation and ambitions.
Here is a list showing how many initiatives are in vogue amid the Indo-Pacific 
region geopolitical dynamics:
1. Connectivity and infrastructure: Trilateral Partnership for infrastructure 
investment in the Indo-Pacific (Australia, Japan, and the United States), 
Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (India and Japan), and Trilateral Infrastructure 
Working Group (India, Japan, and the United States) (Department of State 
2018c; Ministry of External Affairs 2018e; White House 2018a).
2. Multiple issues: India-Australia-Japan Trilateral Dialogue, the United States-
Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, and United States-Japan-India 
Trilateral Meeting (Department of State 2018a; Ministry of External Affairs 
2017a; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018c).
3. Intelligence-sharing: Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement (Australia-
Japan-United States) (Wuthnow 2019).
Defining Indo-Pacific region: one question, many answers
The Quad is strongly linked to the concept of Indo-Pacific once all the four 
members defined that this grouping aims to act in this region. Indeed, Australia, 
India, Japan, and the United States used the last four meetings to assure their 
commitment to the preservation of regional freedom and the enhancement of 
regional security. Likewise, the four countries mean to assure the maintenance of 
a rule-based Indo-Pacific to focus on mechanisms to develop regional connectivity 
and economy and to combat the terrorism, cyber-crimes and piracy (Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade 2018a; 2019; Department of State 2018d; 2019; Ministry 
of External Affairs 2018a; 2019a; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017b; 2017c).
Each of these four members emphasized the importance of deepening 
diplomatic dialogues and strategies in order to preserve mutual interests in the Indo-
Pacific region (Abe, 2012; Australian Government, 2017, P. 40; Ministry of External 
Affairs, 2018d; White House, 2017). However, as Bisley (2018), Jaishankar (2018), 
and Mishra (2019) noticed, a common analytic mistake happens when observers 
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assume the Quad as a formal initiative setting an agenda related to security issues 
involving the Indo-Pacific and aggregating shared interests by four supposedly 
like-minded democracies. In other words, due to geopolitics, the Quad emerges 
as an important diplomatic initiative seeking to compete with Beijing in many 
aspects: from investments in infrastructure and the construction of facilities along 
the Indo-Pacific region to military issues (Huang 2018; Madan 2017; Pant 2017).
In the geopolitical realm, the earliest academic statement on the Indo-Pacific 
dates back to the work of Karl Haushofer in 1920 (Indopazifischer Raum). Since then, 
“Indo-Pacific” was often used in oral discourse, especially in Australia, which was 
premised mainly on Canberra’s two-ocean geostrategic imperatives. Nevertheless, 
until the beginning of the XXI century, the usage of the term was mainly confined to 
Biology essays. Only recently, the term Indo-Pacific was embraced by international 
politics studies because this macro-region, in geographical terms, comprehends 
an area that covers from eastern Africa to western shores of America (Khurana 
2019; Pan 2014).
Indo-Pacific has emerged as a strategic terminology in a moment when countries 
are rearranging their policies and agendas to promptly react to possible consequences 
sparked by the ongoing increase of security, economic, and diplomatic connections 
throughout the Pacific and Indian oceans (Medcalf 2018; Phillips 2016).
Its relevance to the global order is manifold. In economic terms: (a) Indian 
Ocean carries two-thirds of global oil shipments and a third of bulk cargo (Medcalf 
2018); (b) 50% of the world’s commercial influx goes through the Indo-Pacific 
along the sea routes (Department of State, 2018b); (c) the three world’s largest 
gross domestic product are: the United States, China and Japan (World Bank 2019). 
In demographic terms: (d) the five world’s most populous countries (China, 
India, the United States, Indonesia, and Pakistan) are located there (United States 
Census Bureau 2019); (e) by 2030, more than 60% of the world’s middle class will 
reside throughout the Indo-Pacific (Davidson 2018). In military terms: (f) among 
the biggest fifteen military spenders, in 2017, nine are part of the Indo-Pacific 
region (the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, 
Australia, and Canada) (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2018). 
In other words, regional dynamics and rivalries in the Indo-Pacific can potentially 
trigger consequences worldwide because it “represents the most populous and 
economically dynamic part of the world” (White House 2017, 46).
All members of the Quad officially adopted the term Indo-Pacific envisaging 
to address properly the challenges sparked by changes in this region in which 
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adequate military strategies and economic and commercial policies are required 
to protect national interests (Brewster 2018). For Canberra, this macro-region is 
of primary importance because it encompasses their leading economic partners 
and the soaring competition among states could hinder Australian international 
engagement since these disputes between great powers in the region will determine 
the future of the global order (Australian Government 2017; Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, 2018c). New Delhi claims “the destiny of the world will be deeply 
influenced by the course of developments in the Indo-Pacific region” (Ministry 
of External Affairs 2018d). Japanese diplomacy believes world peace relies on an 
Indo-Pacific that values freedom, the rule of law, and free from coercion (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2017b). Likewise, Washington’s foreign policy has officially 
considered Beijing as a “revisionist power” which supposedly attempts to coerce 
neighboring countries and reorder this region to their advantage, besides displacing 
the United States (Department of Defense 2018; White House 2017). 
Nevertheless, do the Quad members understand the boundaries of Indo-Pacific 
similarly to the geographic definition? Not exactly. A region is a volatile idea based 
more specifically on political interests rather than in geographical definitions 
(Hemmere Katzenstein 2002; Pan 2014; Pekkanen, Ravenhill and Foot 2014). Indeed, 
it is a strategic construction based on the interpretation of policymakers following 
objectives and their ideas over national capabilities in terms of pursuing a political 
project or a security agenda in the international arena (Bergin 2018; Le Thu 2018; 
Phillips 2016). There are systematic patterns historically observed corroborating 
this assumption, such as the idea of a macro-region called North Atlantic once 
the United States intended to assure its influence over Western Europe (Hemmer 
and Katzenstein 2002). Therefore, the Indo-Pacific is an imaginary terminology 
that varies according to one country’s foreign policy; that means there is no such 
a thing as a universal definition for this region because the meanings and borders 
are interpreted to fit into a national strategy (Bergin 2018; Gyngell 2018; Hardy 
2019; Varghese 2018).
For India, the Indo-Pacific is a region stretching from the African shores to 
America (Ministry of External Affairs 2018d). Australia defines it as an area “ranging 
from the eastern Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean connected by Southeast Asia, 
including India, North Asia, and the United States” (Australian Government 2017, 1). 
Japan presents an interesting perspective because it urges the United States to 
remain involved in the Indo-Pacific region. However, it officially emphasizes the 
idea of an area connecting Asia to Africa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017c). 
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Finally, for the United States, the Indo-Pacific region “stretches from the west coast 
of India to the western shores of the United States” (White House 2017, 45-46).
India and Japan have developed commercial and strategic relations with African 
countries, and their definitions of Indo-Pacific include Africa (Brewster 2018; 
Gabriel and Carvalho 2018). Furthermore, New Delhi considers its “Act East Policy” 
crucial to Indian engagement to the Indo-Pacific (Hardy 2019; Ministry of External 
Affairs 2017c). Canberra adopted a more restrictive terminology to emphasize a 
region cored in Australia, demonstrating the primary interest of defending regional 
influence and seizing new commercial opportunities due to the consolidation of 
Western Australia as an economic center and diplomatic possibilities with countries 
such as India (Australian Government 2017; Tyler and Bhutoria 2015; Varghese 2018). 
For Washington, this concept reveals a strategy to manage China’s growing 
influence through the establishment of regional partnership and encouraging 
India, Japan, and Australia to take on a proactive diplomatic role alongside the 
United States (Bisley and Phillips 2013; Department Of State 2018b; Scott 2018; 
U.S. Congress 2018).
Managing issues sparked by the rise of China is considered critical for 
Australia, India, Japan, and the United States in the Indo-Pacific region once 
this country has become an important player in terms of international politics 
and economy (De Silva 2019; Medcalf 2018; Pattanaik 2016; White 2013). In this 
respect, many scholars and officials observe such issues as an aspect able to alter 
the post-Cold War liberal order maintained by Washington and organizations such 
as the United Nations (Pant and Joshi 2016). Chinese presence and influence in 
global affairs are not unusually portrayed as a hindrance to the maintenance of 
international laws and organizations. For some scholars and leaders, Beijing has 
attempted to carve out a better position in certain instances through the creation 
or endorsement of commercial, financial or political institutions and initiatives 
such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation 
mechanism, the BRICS, the New Development Bank, China Union Pay, and the 
Universal Credit Rating Group (Stuenkel 2016; Wuthnow 2019). 
Each of these four countries has its reasons to be apprehensive about this 
context: (a) India and Japan maintain historical quarrels, such as disputes for 
territories, with Beijing (Gabriel and Carvalho 2018; Pant and Joshi 2016). (b) All 
the members of the Quad are somehow wary about the establishment of the BRI 
because it could strengthen China’s position not only as a leading regional power 
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but also by expanding its influence throughout the world. In this aspect, New Delhi 
also complains against the fact that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor would 
cross the disputed territories of Kashmir (Gabriel and Carvalho 2018; Ministry 
of External Affairs 2018c). (c) Likewise, these democracies worry that China’s 
diplomatic and economic initiatives could render fragile countries more prone to 
coercive measures (Gale and Shearer 2018; White House 2017). (d) All of these 
countries wish to preserve their own interests on the seas. However, Japan and 
Australia, due to their geographical configuration, rely exclusively on sea lines of 
communications to trade with other nations making them warier of the expansion 
of the Chinese navy and the development of military facilities in the East China 
Sea and the South Pacific (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018d). (e) Washington 
understands that Beijing has pursued economic and military strategies aimed at 
the consolidation of its influence and the regional displacement of the United 
States (Department of Defense 2018). Finally, (f) Australia and the United States 
accuse Chinese organizations of interfering in their domestic affairs (Turnbull 2017; 
White House 2018b).
However, foreign policy is understood here as a translation of national 
possibi lities, capabilities, and interests in the international arena to a strategy 
elaborated in accordance with domestic politics outlooks (Bergin 2018; Le Thu 2018; 
Phillips 2018). Ortega y Gasset once said that each perspective molds different 
ways of understanding reality (Puy 1983); therefore, visions over the Indo-Pacific 
region vary as well as ideas about dealing with China.
In this respect, some issues arise: Washington represents a conception of a 
“free and open” Indo-Pacific, which for the United States means a region where 
four common principles underpinning the international order are safeguarded: 
1) Respect for sovereignty and independence of all nations; 2) Peaceful resolution 
of disputes; 3) Free, fair and reciprocal trade based on open investment, transparent 
agreements, and connectivity; and 4) Adherence to international rules and norms, 
including those of freedom of navigation and overflight. However, this vision 
is intertwined with its disputes against Beijing. Washington considers that its 
military advantage vis-à-vis China is eroding and a negative shift in the regional 
balance of power may encourage competitors of the United States to challenge 
and subvert the free and open order that supports prosperity and security to its 
allies and partners (Defense Intelligence Agency 2019; Department of Defense 
2018; 2019; Le Thu 2018). On the other hand, Australia, India, and Japan present 
different approaches to China, demonstrated by developing their own strategies 
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in order to avoid provoking unwanted responses from Beijing and to maintain 
solid security and diplomatic ties with Washington (Bisley 2018; Tyler and 
Bhutoria 2015).
New Delhi, Canberra, and Tokyo analyze this scenario according to their 
economic, military, and diplomatic resources amidst a soaring rivalry between 
two leading powers. India and Canberra have many complaints against China 
about political and security issues, but these countries prefer to emphasize the 
idea of an inclusive and pragmatic approach towards the Indo-Pacific (Australian 
Government 2017; Bisle, 2018; Ministry of External Affairs 2018d; White 2013). 
Likewise, the Indian diplomacy defends an Indo-Pacific based on a multipolar 
order so that this country could maintain its strategic autonomy in order to define 
positions and commitments in a context that is dominated neither by Washington 
nor by Beijing (Chacko and Panda 2019). Although Tokyo shows some interest in 
pursuing a more assertive position on China’s regional influence and territorial 
claims, the Japanese government has also attempted to reduce tensions with 
Beijing (Gabriel and Carvalho 2018).
It is worth to remember that: China is the major trading partner of the United 
States, India, Japan, and Australia and, except for the US, Japan, India, and Australia 
lack the economic weight to endanger their trade relations with this Asian power 
(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018d; Simões, Landry and Hidalgo 2018; 
United States Trade Representative 2018; White 2013); (b) India presents some 
convergence with China in terms of reforming the instruments of global governance; 
therefore, it joins, alongside Beijing, initiatives such as the BRICS and the AIIB, 
in which New Delhi is the second-largest shareholder (Stuenkel 2016; Zhu 2018); 
and (c) Japan is moving closer to China in the trade as a way to counterbalance 
the steel and aluminum tariffs imposed by the United States (Lin 2019).
Thus, an important inference in this context is that the terminology 
Indo-Pacific could not be reduced to a shared vision endorsed by four democracies 
to refrain China’s military, naval and economic influence throughout this 
macro-region (Gyngell 2018). The idea of the Quad is directly influenced by this 
context because each of these four countries develops different ways and goals 
to engage in the Indo-Pacific region, although they agree on certain topics. The 
question “what is the Quad?” has many interpretations as well as the definitions 
of the Indo-Pacific region. The following section seeks to analyze this initiative 
and its capacities among those divergences on how to act regionally and before 
China.
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Conclusion
This paper concludes that: (1) the Quad holds only a symbolic significance 
among the existing entangled framework of “minilateral forums” in Asia and 
Oceania because it is the only one that comprises specifically Australia, India, 
Japan, and the United States; (2) studying the Quad as an institution capable 
of pursuing a similar status to NATO in the Indo-Pacific region implies in a high 
degree of uncertainty because systematic features demonstrate that minilateral 
forums are easily started, but the advancement towards their formalization is 
less frequent; (3) domestic politics aspects matter in this context not due to a 
state regime, but for national pragmatic understandings about the international 
relations and commercial, diplomatic and security issues; (4) the Indo-Pacific 
does not have a universal meaning based on Geography. Each state defines this 
region according to its interests and to its idea of where the Quad should act; 
(5) the Quad is not a United States-led coalition once the other members avoid 
undesirable consequences; (6) therefore, the attempt to define a joint strategy 
to act in the Indo-Pacific region is hampered by their different national interests; 
these four countries demonstrate different outlooks on China and on how to 
engage internationally, hence the idea of Quad as a military alliance stumbles in 
domestic political issues; (7) thus, this initiative has a more vivid life inside think 
tanks or newspapers than among officials and bureaucracies.
It is reasonable to assume that certain think tanks and media outlets 
envisage a mighty Quad and try to improve the linkages within this initiative. 
The role of such institutions in promoting new ideas and perspectives to different 
governmental sectors is well-documented and triggers a debate about the foreign 
policy decision-making process. However, these visions about the Quad could be 
described as ‘wishful thinking’ since China’s encirclement goes against pragmatic 
understandings of each member. Convergences on these states’ grievances 
against Beijing’s assertive international engagement are an element that should 
not be dismissed, but their divergences on the idea of Indo-Pacific and their 
ways to cope with China are also relevant to understand the real capacities of 
the Quad.
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